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1. THE BACKGROUND AND INTERNATIONAL 
EXPERIENCES OF PUBLIC WORKS PROGRAMMES
Judit Kálmán
In this chapter we provide an overview of international experiences of public 
works. We present the motivation, goals and theoretical background of public 
works as a public policy intervention, the various designs of concrete public 
works programmes, and the main results of evaluations aimed at measuring 
the efficiency and effectiveness of these programmes. The chapter is supple-
mented with boxes which summarise the experiences of a few concrete cases 
in various countries (see Boxes K1.1, K1.2 and K1.3).
Public works programmes were introduced in developed and less developed 
countries with a variety of motivations and goals. These included counter-cy-
clical measures or social policy, infrastructural development and disaster man-
agement aims. The programmes operated in various forms and with various 
target groups and programme structures. The experiences concerning their 
implementation and levels of success are also different.
The labour market background of public works – the problem  
of the long-term unemployed and their activation
The linkage of welfare provisions to public works (workfare) can only be under-
stood in the context of activation interventions directed at the unemployed and 
the fight against poverty. Activation measures try to facilitate the return to the 
labour market of the long-term unemployed and other disadvantaged groups.
Earlier what was meant by activation – strictly speaking – was the size of expenditure for 
active measures, and in this respect, there were significant cross-country differences in 
public policy practices. The crisis has renewed attention to the importance of activation, 
as well as to the fact that different elements of the unemployment and social benefit sys-
tems were interrelated. Thus, the efficiency of active labour market measures depends on 
the generosity of insurance based and social benefits, eligibility conditions and the moni-
toring and enforcement of these conditions, as well as on the sanctions applied in the case 
of non-compliance (see more on this, for example, Martin, 2014, Immervoll–Scarpetta, 
2012, and the OECD series: Grubb–Tergeist, 2006, Duell–Grubb–Singh, 2009, Grubb–
Singh–Tergeist, 2009).
Since the outbreak of the economic and financial crisis, long-term unem-
ployment has further increased (Figure 1.1) in most countries, including Hun-
gary. This causes significant social tensions and puts a serious burden on the 
social and employment system, thus the activation of the unemployed involves 
significant challenges.
Following the rise in unemployment which accompanied the crisis, social 
spending has also risen in almost all countries. It is striking though that in 
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Hungary and Greece, both heavily affected by the crisis, social spending de-
creased, while in Spain and Ireland, which were also inflicted with high rates 
of long-term unemployment, this spending significantly increased (Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.1: The rate of long-term unemployed among the unemployed  
in OECD countries before and after the crisis, 2007, 2013 (percentage)
Abbreviations: AT: Austria; AU: Australia; BE: Belgium; CA: Canada; CL: Chile; 
CZ: Czech Republic; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; ES: Spain; FI: Fin-
land; FR: France; GR: Greece; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IR: Israel; IS: Iceland; 
IT: Italy; JP: Japan; KR: Korea; LU: Luxembourg; MX: Mexico; NL: The Nether-
lands; NO: Norway; NZ: New-Zealand; PL: Poland; PT: Portugal; SE: Sweden; SI: 
Slovenia; SK: Slovak Republic; TR: Turkey; UK: The United Kingdom; US: The 
United States.
Source: OECD (2014a).
Figure 1.2: Changes in social spending and real GDP between 2007/2008  
and 2012/2013 in OECD countries (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list of Figure 1.1.
Source: OECD (2014b).
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There are significant differences across countries in terms of their GDP-ratio 
expenditure allocated to active labour market measures, which are influenced 
by different public policy traditions, labour markets and macro-economic 
situations (Figure 1.3).1
Figure 1.3: Expenditures for active labour market interventions in GDP-ratio  
before and after the crisis in EU member states, 2006, 2012
Abbreviations: AT: Austria; BE: Belgium; BG: Bulgaria; CY: Cyprus; CZ: Czech Re-
public; DE: Germany; DK: Denmark; EE: Estonia; EL: Greece; ES: Spain; FI: Fin-
land; FR: France; HR: Croatia; HU: Hungary; IE: Ireland; IT: Italy; LT: Lithuania; 
LU: Luxemburg; LV: Latvia; MT: Malta; NL: The Netherlands; PL: Poland; PT: 
Portugal; RO: Romania; SE: Sweden; SI: Slovenia; SK: Slovakia; UK: The United 
Kingdom
Source: Own calculations based on the Eurostat Labour Market Policy (LMP) data-
base.
Increasing the rate of active labour market measures is unambiguously recom-
mended by the OECD and the EU, since recent evidence supports the per-
ception that these are much more efficient from a labour market perspective 
than passive measures. In this respect, Hungary is in the mid-range: it spends 
less as a share of GDP on active measures than the Scandinavian countries, 
but more than other East-Central European and especially, Mediterranean 
countries. One of the main reasons for the significant increase of these in 
Hungary after the crisis is attributable to the costs of its increasingly expand-
ing public works programme.
Linking welfare benefits to work
The reform of the classical – primarily benefit based – welfare system, the 
practice of tying the provision of benefits to useful work for the public, and 
enforcement via financial sanctions, that is the development of the workfare 
(work and welfare) system, originates from the United States. The expression 
has been known since the 1970s but the use of these programmes has only 
spread in the developed and developing world since the 1990s.
1 Hudomiet–Kézdi (2011) and 
Galasi–Nagy (2012) write more 
extensively on the international 
experiences of public works.
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In the United States, the Act that enabled member states to launch pro-
grammes linking benefits to work was introduced in 1981. After five years, 
these programmes were already in place in 29 states and, following the wel-
fare reforms of the Clinton era [Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Act (PRWORA), 1996], their number increased sharply. At the same 
time, active labour market measures are used in the United States only to a 
very limited degree and the social welfare system is not as developed either 
as in European countries.
In the United Kingdom, it was also in the 1990s that connecting work 
with the welfare system became one of the main goals of the reforms (wel-
fare to work). The New Deal programmes (New Deal for Young People, New 
Deal 25+, New Deal for Lone Parents, New Deal for the Disabled, New Deal 
50+ targeted those aged 50+ etc.) and a tax reduction to support employment 
(Working Families Tax Credit) were introduced at this time. Several local wel-
fare to work programmes were launched.
The introduction of welfare programmes linked to work and the emphasis 
on work elements also have traditions in the Scandinavian countries, although 
not necessarily in the form of extensive public works programmes (see Box 
K1.2). Welfare programmes linked to work are also prevalent in Australia 
(mutual obligation), Canada (Canada Works and other local programmes) 
and the Netherlands (Work first).
It is typical of workfare systems that beneficiaries have to comply with var-
ious conditions in order to be able to receive benefits. These conditions are 
such that an element of them is aimed at the improvement of the employa-
bility of the beneficiaries (training, rehabilitation, gaining work experience) 
and another element prescribes publicly useful activities (free or very low paid 
public works). The introduction of this system spurred heated social debates, 
as did the phenomenon of welfare dependency, which is often mentioned to 
justify the system.
There are two types of workfare programmes. While the first one is aimed 
at reducing benefit dependency and assisting a return to the primary labour 
market, the second one intends to improve skills and promote employment 
(training, qualifications) for recipients of social services and benefits, or among 
societal groups whose members have less opportunities to become employed 
in the primary labour market. In practice, the individual programmes usu-
ally incorporate both approaches: beyond changing income transfers they 
also seek to create incentives for employment (wages instead of withdrawn 
or reduced benefits).
Public works programmes in developed and developing countries
Specific public works programmes are known not only under the name of 
workfare, but as temporary community projects or work-intensive projects 
in focus
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– reflecting the idea that they are not only about infrastructure construction 
and maintenance projects organised by the government, but also about vari-
ous useful activities beneficial to the public. These programmes are used in 
countries having different levels of development. In several less developed 
countries, they are virtually the only labour market interventions applied. 
In developed countries, however, their use is being retracted – due to the im-
pact of negative evidence in analyses and evaluations –, for they are costly and 
other labour market interventions have proved to be more efficient, primarily 
due to substitution – and crowding-out effects.
The main macro-economic goals of public works programmes usually in-
clude: reduction of seasonal and/or cyclical unemployment, direct job crea-
tion, tackling regional and structural labour market problems, helping certain 
workforce-groups in disadvantaged situations, combating poverty, providing 
income transfers for the poor and a certain stimulus to the economy. The lat-
ter can be realised not only through rising consumption, but public works 
programmes can also encourage the creation of new jobs over the long term. 
Used as countercyclical measures during economic crises, jobs created by pub-
lic works generate income and thus can increase aggregate demand.2
In developing countries the above goals are complemented or substituted 
by disaster management, reduction of seasonal unemployment and income 
losses following poor harvest years or slowdown in infrastructure construc-
tion etc. Most of these programmes tend to offer short-term (typically 3–12 
months) employment for low wages typically in the construction, farming 
and regional development sectors as well as community (education, health, 
social) services (Betcherman et al, 2004). The organisers of public works can 
be municipalities, civil organisations or even private firms.
In countries with high and middle incomes – where there are no budget 
or administrative constraints to implement a rapid response programme – 
public works are primarily used for macro-economic reasons, most often as 
short-term shock therapies, or as temporary measures against high unemploy-
ment (the upper part of Table 1.1). The first and most well-known such public 
works programme implemented with a crisis-management purpose was the 
New Deal in the United States during the 1929–1933 crisis, but more cur-
rent examples include the Argentinian, French, Chinese, South-Korean or 
even the Latvian, Slovenian, Portuguese programmes.
The targeted participants are usually special – less employable and/or long-
term unemployed – social groups, and therefore, these programmes often in-
volve re-employability (combined with training elements), or in some cases, 
welfare functions as well. Such an example is the reform of the Argentinian 
Jefes programme which transformed from a short-term intervention to a large-
scale social safety net reaching the bottom 20 per cent of households (see Box 
K1.2 on the Argentinian experiences). The South-African and Latvian public 
2 Among the EU countries, Lat-
via, Hungary, Slovenia, Portugal 
and the Czech Republic have 
restarted large-scale public 
works programmes in reaction 
to the crisis.
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works programmes were also similar, dedicated to reducing long-term pov-
erty. Latvia, hit hard by the global financial crisis, introduced its programme 
as a reaction. Between 2008 and 2010, the county’s GDP fell by 21 per cent, 
while from 2008 to 2009 the poverty rate increased from 10.1 per cent to 
18.1 per cent, and the employment rate decreased by 11.2 per cent. In reac-
tion to these problems Latvia spent an amount equivalent to 22 billion forints 
(or about 73 million EUR) for its public works program between 2009 and 
2011, which comprised 0.25 per cent of the Latvian GDP and was 2.5 times 
the social and anti-poverty expenditure (Azam et al, 2013).
Table 1.1: Some examples of public works programmes in middle  
and low income countries
Country, programme Start date Main objective/root cause
Middle income countries
Argentina (Trabajar) 1996 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Argentina (Jefes de Hogar) 2002 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Botswana 1978 Seasonal employment
Chile 1993 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
South-Africa 2004 Poverty reduction
Salvador (Programa de Antecion Temporal al. Ingreso) 2009 Poverty reduction
Latvia 2009 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Poland 1992 Active labour market intervention
Mexico (Programa Empleo Temporal) 1995 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Sri Lanka (Emergency Northern Recovery Project) 2009 Poverty reduction
Uruguay (Programa de Actividades Comunitarias) 2003 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Low income countries
Afghanistan 2002 Poverty reduction
Bangladesh (Rural Maintenance Program) 1983 Transition to re-employment
Ethiopia 2005 Poverty reduction
India (MGNREGS) 2006 Guaranteed employment
Yemen 1996 Tackling macroeconomic shocks
Kenya 2009 Poverty reduction
Madagascar (HIMO) 2000 Seasonal employment
Malawi (Central region, infrastructure programme) 1999 Transition to self-employment
Malawi (Social Action Fund) 2009 Seasonal employment
Ruanda (Vision 2020) 2008 Poverty reduction
Tanzania (Social Action Fund) 2000 Seasonal employment
Zambia 2002 Poverty reduction
Source: Subbarao et al (2013) Table 3.3 and 3.4.
In developing countries public works programmes can serve various short and 
long-term objectives (the bottom part of Table 1.1), however, these countries 
also face serious implementation challenges in a number of areas including 
administrative capacities, lack of information and budget sources. Due to 
such obstacles, the targeting of programmes is often combined: on the one 
hand, they are concentrated at the most disadvantaged settlements, which 
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is already some sort of selection, and, on the other hand, the public works 
wages are offered below the market wage (or if it exists, the minimum wage) 
usually accessed by the poor –, which has a self-selection effect, i.e. only those 
persons apply to the programmes who do not have other income opportu-
nities (self-targeting). In these countries public works programmes serve the 
purposes of poverty reduction, guaranteed employment, perhaps transition 
to employment, in contrast to developed or middle income countries, where 
one-off tackling of macroeconomic shocks and active labour market charac-
ter are more determinate.
Theoretical background – arguments for and against  
public works programmes
Linking welfare services to public works is based on the theoretical premise 
that the unemployment benefit, – allowances and other passive provisions 
decrease the willingness to work, which can be counter-balanced by the eli-
gibility conditions and attached sanctions of active programmes – such as 
public works. So this is not about the eligibility criteria that determine ben-
efit entitlement (such as that the claimant’s income is below a certain level 
for means-tested benefits), but about further payment conditioned on behav-
ioural requirements and the sanctioning of non-compliance (OECD, 2007, 
Besley–Coate, 1992, Basu, 2013).
Since access to information is asymmetric, this system helps the service to 
reach the target group. There is a screening effect that can operate through 
conditions which attract only those who are the most in need and keep the 
better-off away from the programme, which in turn, reduces the administra-
tive costs for the government. The operation of this effect is confirmed by 
the study of Dutta et al (2012) who grouped the participants of the Indian 
workfare programme into income groups and demonstrated that the partici-
pation rate was virtually zero among the rich, but 35 per cent among those in 
the lowest income percentile.
Indirectly, a deterrent effect operates. The conditions cause such a degree 
of inconvenience (frequent visits to the public employment agency, com-
pulsory public works, perhaps training, etc) which compels the leaving of 
the unemployment status as soon as possible, or the outright avoiding of 
benefits and the taking of individual steps against poverty. Nonetheless, 
Besley–Coate (1992) draws attention to the fact that the deterrence effect 
of public works can only function if the amount of work to be performed 
is much higher than the claimants usually work without the intervention. 
This, however, is very difficult to measure in countries with extensive grey 
and black economies.3
The following arguments are usually made for workfare type public works 
programmes:
3 Surveys (Molnár et al, 2014 , 
Koltai, 2013c) in Hungary also 
confirm that those in the periph-
ery of the labour market work a 
lot both in registered and unreg-
istered employment, and public 
works is not a deterrent, but is 
perceived in some regions, quite 
contrarily, as an opportunity.
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•	 Political popularity – programmes are visible and can be well communicat-
ed, the tax payers may feel that the beneficiaries provide something to the 
public in exchange for the benefits (value for money).
•	 Provision of fresh work experience to the participants. The lack of work ex-
perience is often one of the major obstacles of employment for the long-
term unemployed.
•	 Well designed public works programmes can indeed create useful infra-
structure, which can promote growth and reduce territorial inequalities, 
etc. (OECD, 2007, Martin, 2000).
•	 Wide-scale public works programmes can have a wage-increasing impact 
in the private sector. Berg et al (2012), for example, have shown that since 
most of the poor of India usually live and work in rural areas, one way 
in which the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS) programme, involving some 54 million households, 
contributed to the reduction of poverty was an indirect effect, whereby mar-
ket wages in the agricultural sector had increased in territories where many 
were involved in the programme. Imbert–Papp (2015) also found similar 
results in relation to this Indian programme.
•	 Strengthening social cohesion, pro-poor growth, reducing exclusion, com-
bating unregistered employment (OECD, 2009, Martin 2014).
Against workfare type programmes the following arguments can be made:
•	 Programmes can stigmatise participants.
•	 The job opportunities offered in public works are usually simple tasks not 
requiring any qualifications, which do not help in gaining real work expe-
rience that is valued by employers and would increase subsequent chances 
of employment. In fact, by constraining the available time on job search, 
public works make employment chances even worse (Kluve, 2006).
•	 The substitution effect of these programmes, that is, if employees are laid off 
and then the given tasks are carried out by public workers, one cannot talk 
about real job creation.
•	 Too intensive use of the programmes can crowd out private employment, 
which can even contribute to the widening of the poverty gap and social 
inequalities, which may generate further public expense.
•	 There can be a budget substitution effect if public works programmes that 
are too long and involve expensive maintenance costs, draw away resources 
from more efficient public policy programmes; this effect has been shown 
by several evaluation studies in the United States with regards to directed 
job creation programmes. (Roy–Wong, 2000).
•	 A so-called locking-in effect takes place in public works when the engagement 
of participants in job search is limited or non-existent, whereby participa-
tion in public works makes people eligible again for unemployment benefits, 
which lead to a kind of public works-benefit spiral (on this see, for example, 
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Brown–Koettl, 2012, on the Hungarian situation Csoba, 2010, Csoba–Nagy, 
2012, Köllő, 2009, Köllő–Scharle, 2011, Molnár et al, 2014). This effect can 
be increased or its development can be facilitated by the method of pro-
gramme design: defining the number of working hours and other criteria.
•	 Deadweight loss can appear (as with all government interventions), that 
is, whether the given job would have also been created without the public 
works support.
•	 Job replacement effect can take place on the part of the individual, which 
means that there are even some employed in public works programmes who 
could otherwise find a job in the primary labour market.
Different forms of public works
As has been shown, public works are complex governmental interventions 
usually affecting multiple, even conflicting problem groups, which in turn 
can decrease their efficiency. The form of implementation and the structure 
of the programme depend on the declared objectives, size, characteristics and 
needs of beneficiary social groups. If these factors are not treated with due 
care, then the poverty reduction effect of public works deteriorates (OECD, 
2009). The forms of public works programmes can be the following.
1) Fixed-term annual employment guarantee programmes, for example, provid-
ing guaranteed employment for a specific duration outside the harvest season. (An 
example of this are the Indian National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, 
later named the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme, and the Employment Guarantee Scheme operating in Maharashtra state.)
2) Governmental employment programmes, which mostly offer large-scale, 
long-term and continuous employment during economic, political or labour 
market tensions (the most well-known example is the New Deal programme im-
plemented in the United States in the 1930s, or the Jefes de Hogar programme 
in Argentina, introduced in 2002). Typically, these larger-scale programmes 
are suspended or reformed following a change in the economic situation. These 
programmes in the United States have achieved some serious and long-lasting 
results in infrastructure development. Public works can mean not only the cre-
ation or maintenance of physical assets or infrastructure. Some experimental 
programmes employ public workers in social or health services – for instance, 
since 2010 in the United States public workers have been employed in home 
care for the elderly and people living with AIDS, or in day care for children, etc.
3) Short-term employment programmes following natural disasters or during 
temporary labour market tensions. This is the most typical form, for exam-
ple, in Africa and South-Asia. These programmes have a dual aim: to elimi-
nate damage and to provide temporary, one-off income transfers to the poor.
4) Explicitly labour intensive employment programmes: the aim of these, 
on the one hand, is to increase aggregated employment, and on the other, to 
Judit Kálmán: the bacKground...
51
create valuable infrastructure. This form is often used by international do-
nor organisations as well, in order to make sure that their organisational ex-
penses also benefit the poor. An example of this could be the AGETIP pro-
gramme in Senegal, the Employment Intensive Infrastructure Programming 
(EIIP) programme of the ILO, and a number of programmes financed by 
the World Bank.
The method of programme financing also varies. In Europe, the USA, Can-
ada and South-Asia, these programmes are typically financed from national 
(and regional, local) government sources, while in Africa by multilateral or-
ganisations and donors. The latter usually provide only temporary employ-
ment and do not guarantee return to the primary labour market. The cost of 
programmes are influenced by capital intensity (especially, materials and as-
sets in respect of high value infrastructure), but administrative, organisational 
and management costs are not negligible either. In public works that create 
physical infrastructure, the cost of the work force is usually around 30–60 
per cent of total costs, while in programmes organised to provide services they 
can reach up to 80–90 per cent (del Ninno et al, 2009).
The selection of participants into public works programmes can occur by 
self-selection, by programmes focusing on disadvantaged local communities, 
by assessing the financial situation of applicants (means testing), or any com-
bination of these. Since most of the time, the programmes provide temporary 
employment, participants are mostly registered as programme beneficiaries 
and not as public employees, hence, the employment regulations and respec-
tive wage levels do not apply for them either. In most of the public works pro-
grammes, payments are not accounted as wages but as compensations, which 
thus can be even lower than the official minimum wage, in fact, social security 
and health contributions are usually not deducted either. Some programmes 
however, – such as the Argentinian Tarabajar or the South-African public 
works programme – provide health and occupational accident-insurance to 
their participants, sick leave and maternity leave for those working more than 
four days per week, and so forth.
The regulation, organisation, practical implementation, administration and 
management of programmes are a complex task. Nevertheless, in the literature 
it is generally accepted that the success and effectiveness of these programmes 
depend exactly on factors such as the timing, adequately determined wage lev-
els – motivation of participants –, and the quality of performed work and/or 
completed infrastructure (Subbarao et al, 2013, Ravallion et al, 2013).
Since public works programmes are often decentralised, the responsibility 
of the local municipalities must be stressed in the selection of projects and 
participants. In the literature a separate concept (program leakage) refers to 
public works-related fraud and corruption phenomena, which are unfortu-
nately frequent, as opportunities arise at several points – but to date few aca-
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demic studies have examined these aspects in detail. Fraud and corruption can 
occur at the point of selection of participants/beneficiaries. Potential partici-
pants may provide false data regarding their household and personal incomes 
in order to get into the programmes. Selection might occur not only follow-
ing predetermined eligibility criteria but also through acquaintances, bribed 
officials, on political grounds, etc and, therefore, the programme is less able 
to meet its original objectives in supporting the poorest. Furthermore, cor-
ruption cases can happen during the implementation phase as well: there are 
more public workers registered than actually employed, the performed job 
is over/under-estimated, or the actual payments differ from wages reported 
and reimbursed in the programme (Subbarao et al, 2013).
Expenditures and number of participants in European  
public works programmes
As we have seen in Figure 1.3, expenditures as a GDP percentage on active 
labour market interventions are very different in European countries. The 
Scandinavian countries are the forerunners, the Mediterranean ones are the 
laggards, and Hungary is situated somewhere in the middle. Within active 
labour market measures, it is direct job creation spending that indicates the 
resources allocated for public works programmes. The GDP ratio of these fig-
ures varies greatly in different countries as well (Figure 1.4). In 2014, Hungary 
(0.47 percentage points of GDP), Ireland (0.28 percentage points of GDP), 
Bulgaria (0.15 percentage points of GDP) and France (0.14 percentage points 
of GDP) spent the most on direct job creating public works programmes. 
Within the expenditure of active labour market measures the spending of 
Slovenia, Ireland, Lithuania and Latvia are relatively high (around 20–30 
per cent, which translates to 0.07–0.14 percentage points of GDP). Togeth-
er with Greece, these are the countries that operate more significant public 
works programmes.4
4 Koltai (2013c) offers more in-
sight into the details, require-
ments and results of European 
publ ic works programmes, 
which include several lessons 
for the Hungarian programme 
as well.
Figure 1.4: Expenditure on direct job creation in GDP percentage, 2006 and 2012
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
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Figure 1.5 shows the rate of expenditure on direct job creation within active 
measures before and after the crisis. Strikingly, the expenditure was increased 
in only three countries in reaction to the crisis: in Bulgaria, Latvia and Hun-
gary. Bulgaria and Latvia however belong to the group of countries that spend 
relatively little proportion of their GDPs on active measures (see Figure 1.3) 
but within active measures, Bulgaria devoted 75 per cent of its spending to 
public works in 2012.5 The Hungarian public works programme achieved 
roughly a similar ratio within active measures by 2012.
Figure 1.5: Expenditure on direct job creation within active labour market measures (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Looking at the ratio of expenditure on public works and direct job creation 
within total (active and passive) labour market expenditures (Figure 1.6), one 
can notice that even in Bulgaria – just as in any other countries – the rate of 
expenditure on public works programmes has fallen back to 20–21 per cent 
since the crisis.
Figure 1.6: Expenditure on direct job creation within total labour market expenditure (percentage)
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Thus, while the majority of European countries have reacted to the crisis with 
other types of labour market interventions, the increase of public works was 
striking in Latvia and especially Hungary (from 14 per cent in 2006 up to 
5 Countries spending the most 
on ALMP measures in terms 
of their GDP ratios: Denmark, 
Sweden and the Netherlands 
do not even feature in Figure 
1.3, which just shows how un-
typical it is for them to tackle 
unemployment by public works.
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40 per cent). The scale of the Hungarian public works programme shows that 
the degree of its application to manage the crisis and long-term unemploy-
ment are unrivalled in the whole of Europe.
Figure 1.7 provides a comparison on the number of participants in public 
works programmes before and after the crisis. These programmes were quite 
significant in Bulgaria, France, Luxemburg, Ireland and Slovakia, with 7–20 
per cent of those seeking employment being public workers in 2006.
In most countries, however, the number of those involved in public works 
decreased during the crisis, even in the case of French, Luxembourgish and 
Irish programmes, which previously were characterised by high participa-
tion rates. In Slovakia the decrease was drastic, but even in Bulgaria, where 
the rate temporarily increased to 15 per cent between 2006 and 2008, yet by 
2012, the proportion of public workers had fallen considerably, implying that 
after the crisis most of the unemployed were treated with other active and 
passive measures in that country too.6 In 2012, the Hungarian public works 
programmes was the most extensive in respect of the rate of job seekers in-
volved in public works, only the Irish and French public works programmes 
approximate this participation rate.
6 In this database there are no 
data with regards to Hungary 
in 2006. The Hungarian data 
on public works is presented in 
detail in Section 2.3.
Figure 1.7: The rate of participants involved in direct job creation  
(public workers/100 job seekers) 2006, 2009, 2012
For country abbreviations, please see the list below Figure 1.3.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat Labour Market (LMP) database.
Evaluations of the efficiency and effectiveness  
of public works programmes
According to international evidence on active labour market measures the 
more a programme is tailor-made and targeted the better chances it has to 
achieve real results. Impact assessments and analyses of some programmes 
relying on micro-econometric tools found different impacts, and often not 
significant or negative effects for various labour market interventions (for de-
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tails on this and the applied methodology see, for example, Kézdi, 2011, Hu-
domiet–Kézdi, 2011, Galasi–Nagy, 2012, Card et al, 2010).
Evaluations addressing the efficiency of public works programmes have 
shown negative results on long term labour market effects (Betcherman et al, 
2004, Martin–Grubb, 2001, Card et al, 2010, Kluve, 2010, Rodriguez-Pla-
nas–Jacob, 2010, Hohmeyer–Wolff, 2010, Brown–Koettle, 2012).
Analysing the active measures of the Swedish labour market reforms realised 
in the 1990s, Calmfors et al (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of a number of 
evaluations and found that the more job creations programmes imitated the 
situation of real employment, the more effective they were. Otherwise, the 
study depicts a rather negative picture in respect of all active employment 
policy measures. According to the authors, the scope and number of active 
measures that Sweden used in the 1990s was by no means efficient. Although 
these programmes have contributed to the reduction of Swedish unemploy-
ment they did not increase the employment rate. In their opinion, smaller 
but more concentrated programmes can be more efficient especially if they 
pertain to the long-term unemployed and less to the young. According to the 
Swedish experience, it is not a good idea to link active measures to regaining 
eligibility for unemployment benefits.
Card et al (2010) have carried out a meta-analysis on 97 evaluations involv-
ing 199 programmes (among them East-European and developing country 
ones) and concluded that it was not the size and time of introduction of active 
labour market programmes, nor the macro-economic situation that mattered, 
but efficiency depended primarily on the type of programmes. While individu-
al counselling, job search assistance and job placements and wage subsidies 
(roughly in this order) could be efficient, public works programmes were un-
successful with respect to subsequent employment and earnings. The success rate 
of training is mixed, small-scale, well targeted training may work well if the 
general growth prospects of the economy are also good. However, training 
in general is usually quite expensive and especially the programmes targeted 
at the young have a minimal positive effect both on subsequent employment 
and earnings. These findings are also supported by Carling–Richardson (2004) 
and Sianesi (2008), who have concluded that the closer public works are to the 
conditions of normal employment, the better their effect is on participants.
Another evaluation from the East-Central European region is the study of 
Rodriguez-Planas–Benus (2010) that examined the Romanian programmes 
running between 1999 and 2002 by the method of paired comparisons and 
using employment history variables. The results of individual program-types 
varied from each other, programmes assisting job search and small enterprises 
had a positive effect on the future employment chances of participants, while 
public works programmes were significantly ineffective. The Slovak public 
works programmes were analysed by Ours (2000) who, in contrast to other 
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evaluations, found the Slovak public works programmes to be effective – they 
significantly decreased the time participants spent on job search and increased 
the length of subsequent employment episodes. The high number of private 
entrepreneurs participating in the Slovak public works could have contrib-
uted to this extraordinary result (Hudomiet–Kézdi, 2011). At the same time, 
Ours’ study found that the Slovak wage subsidy programmes and most of the 
training elements ineffective. Regarding the Latvian programme, Azam et al 
(2013) concluded that the targeting of the programmes was good. In a pro-
pensity score model the programme appeared successful in the short-term, the 
income of participants exceeded the income of non-participating households 
by 37 per cent, and forgone income due to participation in the programme 
was also quite low in comparison with other countries.7 At the same time, the 
Latvian public works programme was very small compared to the weight of 
problems caused by the crisis (Latvia spent 0.25–0.5 per cent of its GDP on 
this in 2010–2011) which have limited the effect of the programme.
Public works programmes are popular in developing countries and have be-
come standard measures to address poverty often used by governments and 
the World Bank8 (see Table 1.1). Despite the extensive use, however, there 
have not been too many analyses prepared, and even the results of those are 
not positive. The targeting of programmes is in general good, the low income 
programmes reach the poor,9 but often people with better incomes also enter 
the programmes. Devereux–Solomon (2006), and McCord–Slater (2009), eval-
uating public works in developing countries, concluded that in comparison 
with other development policy interventions, the results were quite meagre 
both in terms of reducing poverty as well as stimulating growth.
Analysing the world’s biggest volunteer public works programme, the In-
dian NREGS programmes by counterfactual, regression discontinuity de-
sign, Zimmermann (2012) has shown that the programme mattered more in 
terms of combatting poverty, but it had no effects on the Indian rural labour 
market. Concerning NREGS, Azam (2012) has found that the programme 
had significant effects on the activation and wages of females, but the study 
could not demonstrate similarly significant results for males. Examining the 
same programmes, Dutta et al (2012) have also shown that there was a higher 
need for the programme in the poorer parts of India, but actual participation 
rates did not reflect this need. Thus, the NREGS did not guarantee employ-
ment to all the poor: on the one hand, it generated queues and rationing, on 
the other hand, there were territorial inequalities in its targeting and many 
families above the threshold could get access.
There are few empirical studies on the operation of local labour markets, 
and thus, it is not known to what extent public works programmes crowd 
out employment in the private sector. The general view of evaluators is that 
as long as public works programmes are well targeted, they can be effective 
7 On one hand, because Latvia 
in this period was characterised 
by a very high level of unem-
ployment, which is to say, that 
it was very difficult to find other, 
even temporary work too. On 
the other hand, the number of 
benefit recipients and the cover-
age of assistance was rather low, 
and hence, participants in pub-
lic works did not forego serious 
alternative sources of income.
8 Since 2008, the World Bank 
has supported the financing of 
24 public works programmes 
in several developing countries.
9 It is important for targeting to 
adequately define the wages in 
the programme. Zimmermann 
(2012) notes that while wages in 
the public works programmes 
of Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, Chilli, Senegal and Sri 
Lanka remained under market 
wage level, in the programmes of 
Botswana, India, Kenya, Tanza-
nia and Philippines, it occurred 
that higher wages were provided 
resulting in a crowding out ef-
fect on employment in the pri-
vate sector.
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measures of poverty reduction and social safety net provision by offering tem-
porary employment (Subbarao et al, 2013, Betcherman et al, 2004, Ravallion 
et al, 2013, del Ninno et al, 2009, Spevacek, 2009, Martin, 2000, 2014, Dar–
Tzannatos, 1999, Brown–Koettle, 2012, Zimmermann 2014). But, according 
to evaluation results, even this effect is valid only in the short-term, in par-
ticular, when public works wages remain below the minimum wage applying 
to the unskilled workforce (Ravallion, 1999, del Ninno et al, 2009, Ravallion 
et al, 2013). However, as active labour market measures promoting re-integra-
tion and opportunities in the labour market, public works programmes do not 
function well, moreover they are quite costly.
Evaluation evidence shows that it is more in the case of special situations 
when public works programmes can be justified and successful. On the one 
hand, during crises even in middle income countries there might be a need for 
income transfers providing appropriate stimuli for the poor (Brown–Koettl, 
2012). On the other hand, the programmes can be successful if they are aimed 
at regions or workforce groups in very disadvantaged situations, or if they 
also serve other goals besides increasing employment. Such temporary posi-
tive effect was shown, for example, by Vodopivec (1998) with regards to the 
Slovene programme, and the above statement is also valid for the Macedo-
nian and Slovak programmes as well (see Box K1.1). The analyses however 
also highlight the fact that public work programmes only help the situation 
of participants temporarily, and do not contribute to long-term employment 
opportunities. The evaluations produced on more developed and transition 
countries have rather revealed an overall negative effect on the employment 
chances and future earnings of participants (Card et al, 2010, Brown–Koettle. 
2012, Betchermann et al, 2004, Kluve et al, 1999, Heckman et al, 1999, Walsh 
et al, 2001, Rodriguez-Planas–Jacob, 2010, O’Leary, 1998).
Conclusions
Public works programmes are contested because they are highly expensive, 
and their benefits and success is uncertain, especially in the long run. Their 
use is often justified by economic and financial crises, when unemployment 
rises temporarily and aggregated demand decreases. It is for the mitigation 
of these causes that public works are introduced, but then they usually sup-
port re-employability and provide welfare functions, strengthening the so-
cial safety net. The latter objective is typical in developing countries, where 
– largely due to international donor organisations – the use of public works 
is increasingly prevalent.
Behind public works programmes, there is the workfare concept, accord-
ing to which the provision of benefits and income transfers should be linked 
to publically beneficial work. These programmes have spread in developed 
countries especially since the economic and financial crises.
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There are a number of arguments for and against public works programmes 
in the literature. Decisive elements in implementation and success are the 
following: good targeting (to what extent the programme reaches the poor), 
setting wage levels for adequate incentives, a clear and transparent regula-
tion and institutional environment that help counter fraud and corruption 
opportunities.
Nevertheless, evaluation results are rather unfavourable. Public works pro-
grammes seem to be fairly unsuccessful in terms of subsequent employment 
and earnings, yet – if they are well targeted – they can fulfil the role of social 
safety net. It is worth noting that while the programme evaluations produced 
with micro-econometric methods provide very important information about 
the efficiency of these programmes, they usually examine output results (sub-
sequent employment, wages) only. They do not include interactions among 
various labour market-oriented public policies (training, benefits, sanctions, 
other active measures, etc) important for activation. Very few evaluations have 
been done, for instance, on the effect of these programmes on inequalities 
or on the trade-off between efficiency and equity, which can be particularly 
interesting when stricter benefit sanctions increase employment and poverty 
at the same time.
Furthermore, it is important to point out that evaluations usually reveal only 
the short-term effects of the programmes, partly for lack of data, and partly 
for empirical estimation strategy reasons. In other words, the real, long-term 
(several years) impacts of public works programmes on poverty and unem-
ployment are unknown. For the chronically poor, temporary employment is 
not a real and long-term solution and if their continuous employment is not 
possible then public works are not a feasible measure to manage the problem. 
If poverty is extremely widespread in a country, then large-scale public works 
programmes can offer some sort of a temporary social protection, but at the 
same time, they can also crowd out other, alternative and more cost-efficient 
social policy measures.
A brief analysis of the European data reveals that the scale and magnitude of 
the Hungarian public works programme, by allocating all available resources 
for labour market measures only to this type of intervention, is a public policy 
response to the problems of the crisis and long-term unemployment unrivalled 
in Europe. This is one of the reasons why the analysis of the programme’s ef-
ficiency as well as its short and long-term impacts is a very important task.
